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RECENT DECISIONS
Criminal Law-Search and Seizure-Fruits of Warrantless
Automobile Inventory Search Admissible-Last Term the
United States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman' ruled
that evidence seized during a warrantless automobile inventory is
admissible in a criminal prosecution. This decision will have a sub-
stantial impact because it legitimizes the routine police inventory
of impounded vehicles. Police departments throughout the United
States inventory the contents of impounded vehicles ostensibly to
protect the owner's interest in the vehicle and to protect the police
from false property claims.2 The inventory usually consists of a de-
tailed examination and listing of all items within the car, including
the contents of the trunk and glove compartment.3 The examination
sometimes extends to the engine, locked suitcases or sealed contain-
ers.' Because of the potentially unlimited scope of the inventory
search, some courts have labeled it a police ploy for discovering
evidence of crime where probable cause for obtaining a search war-
rant does not exist.- Opperman rejects this view and finds that the
fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure
is not violated by a warrantless inventory of an impounded automo-
bile which is conducted according to standard police procedure.
1. 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976).
2. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1972); Cabbler v. Common-
wealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972); Warrix v. State,
50 Wis. 2d 368, 184 N.W.2d 189 (1971).
3. For a general discussion of warrantless automobile inventory searches, see Comment,
Warrantless Searches & Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L. REv. 835 (1974); Comment, The
Automobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski, 20 VILL. L. REv. 147 (1974); 1 OHIO
N. L. REv. 344 (1974); 53 URBAN L.J. 347 (1975). See also Cleary, Recent Developments in
the Law of Search and Seizure, 1 NAT'L J. OF CRIM. DEF. 21 (1975); Lamb, Making of a Chief
Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 743 (1975); Irons, Burger
Court; Discord in Search and Seizure, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 433 (1974).
4. Lowe v. Caldwell, 367 F. Supp. 46 (S.D. Ga. 1973); People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69,
272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971); Jackson v. State, 243 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1970). In
Caldwell the court found that the police were justilied in opening an envelope and reading a
letter inside in order to protect the defendent', property interest. See also note 93 infra.
5. The first case to question the reasonableness of the inventory search and to limit the
permissible scope of the warrantless automobile inventory was Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4
Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 44 Cal. Reptr. 412 (1971). Accord, United States v. Lawson, 487
F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973); State v. McDougal, 68 Wis. 2d 399, 228 N.W.2d 671 (1975); State
v. Keller, 265 Or. 622, 510 P.2d 568 (1973); State v. Gwinn, 301 A.2d 291 (Del. Super. Ct.
1972).
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The police impounded Opperman's car because he parked it in
a restricted zone overnight. He left it locked with all windows
closed. At the city impound lot, the police ordered the tow truck
operator to break into the vehicle. An officer then seized a number
of articles within the car including a watch on the dashboard and
other items of personal property in the back seat of the car. After
securing all articles of value within the area of his vision, the officer
opened the unlocked glove compartment and found a plastic bag of
marijuana. Opperman was then charged with and convicted of pos-
session of marijuana.' The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, 7 holding that the warrantless search of the glove
compartment was unreasonable.' On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, Opperman argued that because the police had no
reason to believe that the car contained anything which posed a
potential threat to public safety, the warrantless search of the con-
tents of the closed glove compartment was unreasonable and vio-
lated the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the
South Dakota court,9 holding that warrantless police inventories
conducted pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable
and constitutionally permissible as to belongings left in plain view
and in unlocked glove compartments.
It is the position of these writers that supporting precedent for
the Opperman decision is slim. In addition, Opperman fails to dis-
cuss the central element in the analysis of the reasonableness of any
search - the scope of the inventory. This article will examine
Opperman's consistency with the fourth amendment reasonable-
ness standard and with prior search and seizure law. It will also
discuss the scope question left undecided in Opperman in light of
the recent Wisconsin case of State v. McDougal.'" Finally, this
article will attempt to predict the impact of Opperman on related
automobile search situations.
6. Opperman was convicted of possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in violation
of S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 39-17-95 (1967).
7. State v. Opperman, - S.D.__, 228 N.W.2d 152 (1975).
8. The Supreme Court of South Dakota reasoned that: (a) where defendant's car was
parked in a designated parking space and was towed for violating a mere parking ordinance,
(b) where there was no indication that defendant could not have arranged for safekeeping of
his car at the time or after it was towed, and (c) where there was no reason to believe that
the car contained anything which posed a potential threat to public safety, the warrantless
search of the car's closed glove compartment was unreasonable.
9. Burger, C.J., delivered the plurality opinion, joined by Blackmun, Rehnquist and
Stevens, J.J.; Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion; Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion
joined by Brennan and Stewart, J.J.; White, J., filed a separate dissent.
10. 68 Wis. 2d 399, 228 N.W.2d 671 (1975).
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS STANDARD
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that people have a right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures of their persons, houses, papers and effects." This lan-
guage has been generally interpreted to mean that a search con-
ducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se.' 2 However, there
are exceptions to this general rule. The most commonly invoked
exception to the search warrant requirement is the exigent circum-
stances justification. The Court has recognized that in situations
where obtaining a search warrant is impractical or impossible,
sound public policy requires dispensing with the search warrant
requirement and applying the reasonableness standard. Thus, the
test to determine the constitutionality of a search is not whether a
search warrant was procured, but whether the search was reasona-
ble."
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The fourth amendment was made applicable to the states under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); the exclusionary rule has
been explicitly applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. See also Dombrowski v. Cady, 471 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nor. Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
13. See Comment, 87 HARv. L. REv. 835, 836 (1974). Exceptions to the search warrant
requirement which previously have been classified as "exigent circumstances" include pur-
suit, plain view, consent, search incident to arrest, administrative searches, caretaking
searches and automobile emergency. See Player, Warrantless Searches & Seizures, 5 GA. L.
REv. 269 (1971), for a list of cases delineating the scope of each exception; see also concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Powell, 96 S. Ct. at 3103 n. 10.
14. Warrantless searches based on exigent circumstances must nevertheless be reasona-
ble. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967); United States v. Rabinowitz,
330 U.S. 56 (1950); see note 15 infra and accompanying text.
15. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). Note, however, that Rabinowitz
was overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Chimel Court rejected
Rabinowitz's reasonableness standard, stating that the Rabinowitz argument was "founded
on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of police conduct and not
on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests." 395 U.S. at 764-65. This rejec-
tion was acknowledged in United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972),
where the Court stated:
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of "unreasonable searches and
seizures" the definition of "reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific
commands of the warrant clause. . . .The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment
is not dead language. ...
It is not an inconvenience to be somehow "weighed" against the claims of police
efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part of our machinery of govern-
ment, operating as a matter of course to check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly
19771
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The Opperman majority found that the search warrant require-
ment is obviated by exigent circumstances in an automobile inven-
tory situation. The Court reasoned that the inherent mobility of an
automobile creates exigent circumstances which make enforcement
of the search warrant requirement impractical and often impossi-
ble.'" The Court also concluded that less rigorous search warrant
requirements for automobile searches are necessary because "the
expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is signifi-
cantly less than that relating to one's home or office."'" In determin-
ing the reasonableness of the automobile inventory search, the
Court placed great emphasis on the fact that "local police depart-
ments generally follow a routine practice of securing and
inventorying automobiles' contents."8
However, the Court failed to explain why the fact that the inven-
tory was conducted according to routine police procedure should
tend to make the search reasonable. Lower courts have pointed out
that the question of whether a search is made according to police
regulations should have no bearing on the question of whether the
search is reasonable under the circumstances.'9 According to the
overzealous executive officers" who are a part of any system of law enforcement. Id.
at 315 (footnote omitted).
See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 522 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
Despite Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that reasonable-
ness is the only general standard with which to test searches and seizures in Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
16. 96 S. Ct. at 3095. In support of its "mobility" argument, the Court cited Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
17. 96 S. Ct. at 3096. In support of its "lesser expectation of privacy" argument, the Court
cited Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974), where the Court declared:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the respository of personal
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public tho-
roughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view . . . .This is
not to say that no part of the interior of an automobile has Fourth Amendment protec-
tion; the exercise of a desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one's right to be
free of unreasonable government intrusion.
18. 96 S. Ct. at 3096. Although situations in which vehicles may be impounded are
sometimes legislatively specified, the inventory procedure is rarely required by statute or
ordinance. Additionally, it is unclear when an inventory becomes standard. See United States
v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1972); State v. Montague, 73 Wash. 2d 381, 438 P.2d 571
(1968).
19. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973). In Camara v. Municpal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Supreme Court found suspect the argument that housing inspections
were routine administrative procedures under local law. Cf. Comment, The Fourth Amend-
ment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521 (1968).
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court in United States v. Lawson,20 "the essential test of the validity
of a search is reasonableness; yet the standard of reasonableness
must be evaluated in light of the Fourth Amendment - not in light
of what [the Court's] view of reasonable police procedure might
be." A search which is an unreasonable intrusion under the circum-
stances is not made reasonable by repetition. In fact, repetition and
routineness should make the intrusion even more suspect in the
Court's eyes because too often both victim and perpetrator alike
begin to assume validity from general practice. 21 Nevertheless, the
Opperman majority deduced reasonableness from the mere fact that
the police used a routine procedure.
Many courts that have addressed the inventory question prior to
Opperman applied a sounder reasonableness test,12 first enunciated
by the California Supreme Court in Mozzetti v. Superior Court.Y In
Mozzetti, the court found a general inventory search of items not
in plain view to be a random search which is "the precise invasion
of privacy which the Fourth Amendment was intended to pro-
hibit." 4 Mozzetti and other cases which hold inventory searches to
be unreasonable as to any articles not in plain views generally deter-
mine reasonableness by balancing the individual's right to privacy
against the police department's need to search. Police departments
assert that the inventory serves three legitimate police needs: (1)
protection of the owner's interest in the contents of the car, (2)
protection of the police from harm, and (3) protection of the police
from false claims. However, the courts have generally found this
argument unpersuasive when balanced against the individual's
right to privacy.26
20. 487 F.2d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1973).
21. See Cabbler v. Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, 374 F. Supp. 690, 698 n.
7 (E.D. Va. 1970).
22. See, e.g., Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 p.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412
(1971); State v. Gwinn, 301 A.2d 291 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); State v. McDougal, 68 Wis. 2d
399, 228 N.W.2d 671 (1975).
23. 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
24. Id. at 710, 484 P.2d at 91, 94 Cal. Rptr. 419.
25. The plain view exception provides that articles falling within plain view of an officer
who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution, even if the officer proceeds without a search
warrant. For a general discussion of the plain view doctrine see Moylan, Plain View Doctrine:
Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1046
(1975).
26. State v. McDougal, 68 Wis. 2d 399, 228 N.W.2d 671 (1975). For a general discussion
of McDougal see text accompanying note 97 infra; Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699,
484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
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The balancing test developed in Mozzetti is the basis of the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Opperman. Justice Powell,
concurring, approved the warrantless automobile inventory search,
but suggested that the resolution of the question requires "a weigh-
ing of the governmental and societal interests advanced to justify
such intrusion against the constitutionally protected interest of the
individual citizen in the privacy of his effects. ' 27 Applying this bal-
ancing test to Opperman, Powell found the inventory search reason-
able because it was limited to an inventory of an unoccupied auto-
mobile and was conducted according to standard police procedures.
Justice Marshall, writing a vigorous dissent, 28 also balanced the
governmental interests against the individual interests at stake in
automobile inventory situations. Marshall concluded that the three
purposes of an inventory search, i.e., protection of the owner's prop-
erty while in police custody, protection of the police from false
claims and protection of the police from danger, do not justify relin-
quishment of the individual's privacy expectations." While Justice
Marshall acknowledged that privacy expectations associated with
automobile travel are in some regards less than those associated
with home or office, he found it equally well-established that a
search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy.
Thus Justice Marshall considered a glove compartment to be a pri-
vate area of an automobile which the police had no legitimate right
to search.30 The dissent would require specific consent3 of the owner
before an inventory could be conducted. Absent specific consent,
such a search should be permissible only in exceptional circumstan-
ces, where the need to search a particular car outweighs the invasion
27. 96 S. Ct. at 3101. The majority disagreed with Mr. Justice Powell's search warrant
analysis and found the policies underlying the warrant requirement inapplicable to non-
investigative police inventories of automobiles lawfully within governmental custody. "The
probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of rou-
tine administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protec-
tive procedures are a subtrafuge for criminal investigations." Id. at 3097 n. 5.
28. Justices Brennan and Stewart also joined in Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent. Mr.
Justice White also dissented and concurred with most of the analysis of the dissenting opin-
ion.
29. 96 S. Ct. at 3106.
30. Id. at 3105. See also Pigford v. United States, 273 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1971). In Pigford,
the court found the inventory of the glove compartment, seats and trunk explanatory in
nature and for the purpose of discovering evidence of crime and therefore unreasonable.
31. See Schneckloth v. Busamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624 (1946). Arguably, if protection of the owner's property interest is a legitimate purpose of
the inventory, it is only reasonable that the owner be asked whether or not he wants his
automobile to be impounded.
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of the owner's right to privacy. To meet this requirement of the test,
Justice Marshall argued, the police must show specific cause to
believe that a search is necessary to preserve property threatened
by impoundment and that the police have exhausted all reasonable
efforts to obtain the owner's consent.32 Justice Marshall contended
that the majority's position incorrectly elevated the conservation of
property interests above the "privacy and security interests pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment."3 Thus, the dissent in
Opperman concluded, as did the California court in Mozzetti, that
the inventory failed to meet the reasonableness standard of the
fourth amendment because the needs of the state failed to outweigh
the right of the individual to privacy.
The majority in Opperman did not set up a balancing test to
determine the validity of warrantless automobile searches. Instead,
the Court singled out two factors as dispositive of the issue: (1) the
distinction between automobiles and homes, and (2) the caretaking
purposes of the inventory. The well-established law of search and
seizure under the fourth amendment has long recognized the dis-
tinction between automobiles and homes or offices.34 Warrantless
examinations of automobiles have been upheld in circumstances
which would not justify a search of a home or office. 5 The
Opperman Court cited two factors as the basis for this disparate
treatment of automobiles and homes - the mobility of the automo-
bile and the more limited public expectations of privacy relating to
the automobile.
According to the Court, the inherent mobility of automobiles
creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necess-
ity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.36
This mobility exception to the warrant requirement was first enun-
ciated in Carroll v. United States.37 In that case, federal prohibition
officers, acting without a warrant, stopped and searched a car being
operated on the highway because they had probable cause to believe
the car contained contraband. Although the Court upheld this war-
rantless search, the Court also emphasized that while the mobility
factor justified the failure to obtain a warrant, the requirement of
32. 96 S. Ct. at 3109.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 3095.
35. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973).
36. 96 S. Ct. at 3095.
37. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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probable cause defined the circumstances in which such a warrant-
less search would be reasonable.3 1
Carroll established a rule allowing warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles that are being operated on the highway. Opperman further
pointed out that the Court "has also upheld warrantless searches
where no immediate danger was presented that the car would be
removed from the jurisdiction. 13 9 However, as authority for this
proposition the Court cited Chambers v. Maroney" and Cooper v.
California,4' cases which do not entirely support that proposition.
In Chambers, four men were arrested when their car was stopped
in connection with a filling station robbery. The car was then taken
to the police station where a search revealed incriminating evidence.
In upholding the warrantless search, the Chambers Court stated:
On the facts before us, the blue station wagon could have
been searched on the spot when it was stopped since there was
probable cause to search and it was a fleeting target for a
search. The probable-cause factor still obtained at the station
house and so did the mobility of the car.4"
Thus the Court in Chambers extended the mobility exception to a
car no longer in operation and already impounded. Nevertheless,
the Carroll-Chambers doctrine does not apply unless the car was
initially stopped on a road or highway.4 3
Cooper v. Californiall so expanded the Carroll-Chambers doc-
trine as to lose sight of its original justification - exigency resulting
from mobility. In Cooper, defendant was arrested on a narcotics
charge as he was about to enter his car. The car was impounded
pursuant to a state statute45 and searched without a warrant one
week later. Narcotics were found and led to Cooper's conviction.
Relying on Carroll, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
38. The Carroll Court stated: "Having thus established that contraband goods concealed
and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a
warrant, we come now to consider under what circumstances such search may be made." Id.
at 153.
39. 96 S. Ct. at 3096.
40. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
41. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
42. 399 U.S. at 52.
43. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460 (1971).
44. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
45. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 116 (West) (repealed by 1969 Cal. Stats. ch 280, § 1)
authorized any officer making a narcotics arrest to seize any vehicle used to conceal, trans-
port, sell or facilitate the possession of narcotics and that such vehicle be held as evidence
until forfeiture or release.
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search despite the ease with which a warrant could have been ob-
tained." This result ignores the fact that the Carroll doctrine arose
due to the impracticability of obtaining a warrant. 47 Nevertheless,
the Court in Cooper did hold that a search is reasonable if con-
ducted for purposes relevant to the offense for which the defendant
was arrested (narcotics), the grounds upon which the car was im-
pounded (transporting narcotics), and the purpose for which it was
being held (as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding)." Thus in Cooper
the Supreme Court did sanction a warrantless search of an immobi-
lized vehicle conducted in the absence of probable cause.
However, Cooper is not authority for the result that the Court
reached in Opperman. In Cooper the search involved a state forfei-
ture statute which gave the police a possessory interest in the car.49
It is clear that even an expansive reading of Cooper cannot extend
its rationale to cases where the police do not have a right to deny
possession to the car's owner." It is equally clear that in Opperman
the reason for the impoundment was not in any way related to the
defendant's subsequent arrest. Thus, the circumstances in Cooper
differ qualitatively from those in Opperman.
Chambers and Carroll permitted certain probable cause
searches to be carried out without warrants due to the exigencies
created by the mobility of automobiles. It is significant to note the
fact that both decisions reaffirmed that the standard of probable
cause necessary to authorize such a search is no less than the stan-
dard applicable to the search of a home or office." Opperman has
substantially broadened the distinction between automobiles and
homes or offices by making clear that the fourth amendment stan-
46. 386 U.S. at 60.
47. See 7 Loy. OF L.A. L. REv. 550, 553 (1974). See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969), which affirmed the continued validity of the practicability principle delineated in
Carroll.
48. 386 U.S. at 62.
49. Cooper has been so interpreted in United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (6th
Cir. 1975). In Opperman, Justice Powell, concurring, shared that view: "In Cooper the Court
validated an automobile search that took place one week after the vehicle was impounded
on the theory that the police had a possessory interest in the car based on a state forfeiture
statute. ... 96 S. Ct. at 3100 n. 2. But see the Opperman majority opinion: "There was
of course, no certainty at the time of the search that forfeiture proceedings would ever be held.
Accordingly, there was no reason for the police to assume automatically that the automobile
would eventually be forfeited to the State." 96 S. Ct. at 3099 n. 8.
50. Comment, 87 HAnv. L. REv. 835, 848 (1974).
51. South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3105 (dissenting opinion), citing Chambers,
399 U.S. at 51 and Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155-56. This is, of course, "probable cause in the sense
of specific knowledge about a particular automobile." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 281 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
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dard of probable cause is somehow less when applied to automo-
biles. An automobile is now different per se, regardless of its imme-
diate mobility.
The second reason cited by the Opperman majority for the dis-
tinction between automobiles and homes or offices was that "the
expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is less than
that relating to one's home or office." 2 The majority listed two
reasons for this diminished expectation of privacy. First, law en-
forcement officials are necessarily brought into frequent contact
with automobiles. 3 Secondly, the public nature of automobile travel
diminishes the expectation of privacy. 4
The only case cited by the Opperman majority in support of this
view, Cardwell v. Lewis,55 recognized that automobile travel sacri-
fices some privacy interests as to things in plain view. However, as
noted in the Opperman dissent, "there is no question of plain view
in this case."56
In addition, a search, even of an automobile, is a substantial
invasion of privacy. 7 The Opperman Court accurately indicated
that distinctions have been drawn between automobiles and homes
or offices in relation to the fourth amendment. But the Court did
not adequately explain how or why these distinctions should be
applied in the case of a closed glove compartment. The Court in-
stead seemed to regard the word "automobile" as a "talisman in
whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away."58
The second dispositive factor which justifies the automobile in-
ventory is the custodial rather than the investigatory purposes of the
search. As a part of the "community caretaking functions" of the
police, officers frequently impound automobiles. 9 Once impounded,
local police generally follow a routine practice of securing and inven-
torying the car's contents. Such procedures, the Court indicated,
were prompted by three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's
property while it remains in police custody; the protection of the
police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; the
protection of the police from potential danger."
52. 96 S. Ct. at 3096; accord, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
53. Comment, 87 HAav. L. REv. at 848-49 (1974).
54. Id.
55. 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
56. 96 S. Ct. at 3105 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975).
58. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971).




The validity of an inventory, as with any search, depends upon
the reasonableness of the intrusion in light of all the circumstan-
ces. " The purported reasons for an inventory must be justified in
light of the particular facts of the case. The majority decision failed
to show how the three'cited reasons justifying an inventory applied
to the specific factual circumstances of Opperman.
The Court asserted that inventorying is necessary to protect the
owner's property. However, it is difficult to understand why leaving
a locked car in a police impound lot is not in and of itself sufficient.2
The car and its contents should be as safe in the police impound lot
as it is on the street or wherever it was left illegally parked:
[I]tems of value left in an automobile to be stored by the
police may be adequately protected merely by rolling up the
windows, locking the vehicle doors and returning the keys to
the owner. The owner himself, if required to leave his car tem-
porarily, could do no more to protect his property.63
Further, if the impounding is in fact done in order to protect the
owner's property, it is logical to require that the owner choose
whether or not he wants an inventory taken. This is essentially the
position adopted by Justice Marshall in dissent: "It is at least clear
that any owner might prohibit the police from executing a protec-
tive search of his impounded car, since by hypothesis the inventory
is conducted for the owner's benefit. '64
The second "distinct need" for warrantless inventory searches,
to protect the police against claims of lost or stolen property, is even
61. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18
n. 15 (1968), wherein the Court said:
In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs
all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope of
the particular intrusion, in the light of all the exigencies of the case, a central element
in the analysis of reasonableness.
62. People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 80, 272 N.E.2d 464, 470, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945, 954
(1971). Chief Justice Fuld, dissenting, stated:
In the present case, all the precautions necessary had been pursued: the defendant's
automobile was towed from where it had been parked directly to a guarded police
facility and there it remained - undoubtedly with its doors and windows locked -
under the sole custody and control of the police. It seems quite obvious that nothing
was to be gained by the further tactic of a police inventory of its contents.
But see Comment, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 835, 853 (1974).
63. Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
Accord, United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973); Boulet v. State, 17 Ariz. App.
64, 495 P.2d 504 (1972).
64. 96 S. Ct. at 3108.
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less convincing. 5 This justification assumes that the police are
under a legal duty to protect the property of the owners. The precise
nature of this duty has been interpreted by several state courts. The
Supreme Court of California, in Mozzetti v. Superior Court con-
cluded that the police were involuntary bailees having a duty to use
"slight care."66 The Supreme Court of South Dakota termed police
in possession of an impounded vehicle "gratuitous depositors" hav-
ing a duty of slight care.67 Despite the different terminology, both
cases held that this duty is fulfilled by rolling up the windows and
locking the doors. 8
Moreover, claims of lost or stolen property cannot be ended sim-
ply by the making of an inventory. It easily can be asserted that
property was lost or stolen prior to the inventory. Additionally, if a
police officer seeks to steal an item from an impounded car, all he
need do is fail to list it on the inventory form. As the Opperman
dissent pointed out, "[i]f such claims can be deterred at all, they
might more effectively be deterred by sealing the doors and the
trunk of the car so that an unbroken seal would certify that the car
had not been opened during custody.""9
Finally, it is of considerable interest to note that protecting the
police from liability was not considered relevant in Opperman. As
indicated by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion:
65. See Szwajkowski, The Aftermath of Cooper v. California, 1968 U. OF ILL. L.F. 401, 407-
08, for the proposition that absent a special statutory provision, the inventory would not be
conclusive in a civil action for loss of property from the vehicle, since (1) an article might be
stolen before the inventory or omitted from it; (2) the inventory is prepared by the police and
is to some extent a self-serving document; and (3) even if the police have the arrestee acknowl-
edge the inventory by signing the receipt, the inventory would not be binding on a third-party
claimant.
See also Comment, Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 626 (1970).
66. 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
67. State v. Opperman, - S.D. -, 228 N.W.2d 152 (1975). See R. BROwN, THE LAW
OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 328 (2d ed. 1955). Police who impound a vehicle have been considered
gratuitous bailees. The duty of a gratuitous bailee, under the traditional view, is that he is
only liable to the owner for damage or loss due to his gross negligence. Id. at 328-29. Another
view treats police as involuntary bailees who are only obliged to use ordinary care when in
possession of the goods. Liability, however, only is incurred upon negligent misdelivery. See
generally, id. at 399-415.
68. Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d at 708, 484 P.2d at 89-90, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417-
18; State v. Opperman, - S.D. at - , 228 N.W.2d at 159; accord, United States v.
Lawson, 487 F.2d at 475-76.
69. 96 S. Ct. at 3107-08 nn. 10 and 12; see Cabbler v. Superintendent, Virginia State
Penitentiary, 374 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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Respondent's motion to suppress was limited to items inside
the automobile not in plain view. And, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota here held that the removal of objects in plain
view, and the closing of windows and locking of doors, satisfied
any duty the police department owed to the automobile's
owner to protect property in police possession.0
The third and final basis upon which the majority sought to
justify the inventory in Opperman was the protection of the police
from potential harm. However, in Opperman the safety interest is
at best a make-weight argument, since, as pointed out by the dis-
sent, "the sole purpose given by the State for the Vermillion police's
inventory procedure was to secure valuables." 7' Even aside from the
actual basis for the police practice in Opperman "except in rare
cases, there is little danger associated with impounding unsearched
automobiles. '2 Thus in the absence of knowledge or at least a ra-
tional belief that the car contains dangerous cargo, it would seem
unreasonable to allow an infringement of fourth amendment
rights.73
In summary, the majority sought to justify the Vermillion police
department's inventory of Opperman's car by stating that such a
routine practice developed in response to three distinct needs. How-
ever, the validity of this justification in general is suspect. More-
over, it is extremely doubtful that the factors of police protection
from danger and false claims are even relevant to the particular
facts of the Opperman case. Therefore, the majority decision rests
tenuously upon the ground that an inventory search of an im-
pounded vehicle is a valid attempt to protect the owner's property.
Surely the loss of valuables cannot be balanced against the forfei-
ture of a constitutional protection.7
I1. THE COURT'S USE OF PRECEDENT
Although decisions concerning the legality of routine inventories
of impounded vehicles have resulted in an area of the law character-
ized as "something less than a seamless web," ' ' the Opperman ma-
70. Id. at 3101 n. 3 (Powell, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 3106.
72. Id. at 3101 (Powell, J., concurring).
73. In Cady v. Dombrowski, -413 U.S. 433 (1973), a belief existed that a gun might be
found in the car. This is unlike Opperman, where the record disclosed that the search was
not tailored in any way to safety concerns.
74. 96 S. Ct. at 3109 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
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jority suggested that its decision is supported by a line of clear
precedent. The truth is somewhere in between. The last part of the
majority opinion traced the prior Supreme Court decisions that
point "unmistakably to the conclusion reached by both federal and
state courts that inventories pursuant to standard police procedures
are reasonable.""6 The three cases which "pointed the way to the
correct resolution" were Cooper v. California," Harris v. United
States' s and Cady v. Dombrowski.9
The Opperman Court, in its analysis of Cooper, rejected the
contention that Cooper was inapposite because the vehicle in
Opperman was not impounded under a forfeiture statute. The Court
based its position upon the fact that as of the time of the search
there was no certainty that forfeiture proceedings would ever be
held. Accordingly, there was no reason for the police to assume
automatically that the automobile would eventually be forfeited to
the state. Upon these grounds, the majority concluded that "[n]o
reason would therefore appear to limit Cooper to an impoundment
pursuant to a forfeiture statute." 0
The effect of the Court's expansive reading of Cooper is to cast
a cloak of legitimacy over a warrantless search of an impounded
vehicle one week after it has been seized. Thus, not only has the
Opperman Court ignored the original purpose of the mobility excep-
tion8l' but it has also ignored its own language in Cooper where the
Court pointed out that the police seized the automobile
because of the crime for which they arrested petitioner. They
seized it to impound it and they had to keep it until forfeiture
proceedings were concluded. Their subsequent search of the car
- whether the State had "legal title" to it or not - was closely
related to the reason petitioner was arrested, the reason his car
had been impounded, and the reason it was being retained 2
The majority also decided to ignore the fact that in Opperman, the
reason for impoundment (a parking violation) was not in any way
related to the defendant's subsequent arrest. The Opperman Court
76. 96 S. Ct. at 3098.
77. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
78. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
79. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
80. 96 S. Ct. at 3099 n. 8.
81. 7 Loy. oF L.A. L. REV. 550 (1974). "The foundation of the Carroll exception is the
practicability of obtaining a warrant, which is itself dependent on the presence or absence of
the element of mobility." Id. at 551.
82. 386 U.S. at 61.
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thereby eliminated many of the important distinguishing factors
between Cooper and Opperman.
The Court's reliance on Harris v. United States13 is also mis-
placed. In Harris the Court upheld the introduction of evidence
seized by an officer in the process of securing a car after an inventory
search. According to the Opperman Court, Harris held "that the
intrusion was justifiable since it was 'taken to protect the car while
in police custody'." s4 But the "intrusion" which the Harris Court
was referring to was the activity of the officer in securing the car.
Nothing was found during the inventory, so the officer opened an-
other door in order to roll up the windows and lock the door. It was
during this procedure that the evidence was discovered. The Su-
preme Court in Harris made it clear that the "intrusion" was sepa-
rate from the search: "[T]he discovery of the card was not the
result of a search of the car, but of a measure taken to protect the
car while it was in police custody. Nothing in the Fourth Amend-
ment requires the police to obtain a warrant in these narrow circum-
stances. ' 85 Nevertheless, the Opperman majority used Harris as
authority for the proposition that warrantless inventories are justifi-
able when taken to protect a car while in custody.
Even assuming the validity of the Court's interpretation of
Harris, Harris was predicated on and limited to the "plain view"
exception to the warrant requirement:
Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card,
with the name of the robbery victim on it, was plainly visible.
It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of
an officer who had a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence."
As such it is difficult to see just how a "plain view" case can be used
to legitimize a warrantless excursion into a closed glove compart-
ment.
The majority also relied on Cady v. Dombrowski" to illustrate
83. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
84. 96 S. Ct. at 3099.
85. 390 U.S. at 236.
86. Id. Accord, Comment, The Automobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski
20 VILL. L. REv. 147, 171 (1974):
It is submitted that had the Court intended that Harris be interpreted as approving
the inventory search, it would not have separated the inventory from the procedure in
which the evidence was found. Thus Harris should be read merely as the application
of the plain view doctrine. . ..
87. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). One commentator concluded that the
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that a warrantless incursion is justifiable as part of the local police
caretaking function. The protective search in Cady was instituted
solely because local police "were under the impression that the inca-
pacitated driver, a Chicago police officer, was required to carry his
service revolver at all times." 8 Thus, the police had a special reason
for searching the automobile in Cady - a reason that did not exist
in Opperman. It is difficult to perceive a logical transition from
Cady to Opperman. The police in a typical inventory search will
have no reasonable belief as to the car's contents."9 This was the case
in Opperman. The Vermillion police had no reason to believe there
was a need to protect the community's safety and thereby bring the
Cady rationale into application.
However, the majority appears to have latched onto the fact that
in Cady "the protective search was carried out in accordance with
standard procedures in the local police department (citation omit-
ted), a factor tending to insure that the intrusion would be limited
in scope to the extent necessary to carry out the caretaking func-
tion."99 The Court thereby attempted to apply Cady by analogy to
the factual situation in Opperman. In Cady, a search pursuant to
standard procedures was upheld as reasonable. The Opperman
Court, therefore, implicitly reasoned that any inventory searches
pursuant to standard police procedures should also be deemed rea-
sonable. This contention, however, ignores the fact that the routine
procedure in Cady was only to search when there was a reasonable
belief that the car contained a dangerous weapon.9
As this analysis of Cooper, Harris and Cady reveals, the Su-
preme Court attempted to leave the impression that the result in
Opperman was simply the next logical step in a consistent progres-
sion of cases. In doing so, the Court was forced to expand Cooper
beyond its facts, interpret Harris in a manner contrary to its actual
rationale and broaden the Cady rule beyond recognition.
Ill. THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH
The Opperman Court not only used precedent in a questionable
manner, it also failed to answer the most crucial search and seizure
decision in Cady laid a firm basis for inventory searches if not endorsing them sub silentio.
See Comment, 20 VILL. L. REv. 147 (1974).
88. 96 S. Ct. at 3099.
89. 96 S. Ct. at 3100 n. 2 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 3099 (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 3108 n. 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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question - the scope of the search. The scope of a particular intru-
sion is a central element in the fourth amendment reasonableness
standard. Although Opperman legitimized the inventory of items
left in plain view and in an unlocked glove compartment, the Court
did not consider whether thepolie-night'open and'search a locked
glove compartment, a closed or locked trunk, or closed, locked or
sealed packages inside the car, glove compartment or trunk.
In contrast to Opperman, lower courts have tackled the scope
question head-on.2 These courts almost summarily allow the inven-
tory of items in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine police may
seize evidence or contraband encountered inadvertently during an
otherwise valid intrusion.13 Thus, police may seize what they ob-
serve in a car if they have a legitimate reason to be in or around the
vehicle. Since the Opperman Court found the authority of the police
to impound vehicles "beyond challenge,"94 the police had a legiti-
mate reason to be in or around the car. Therefore, the police may
inventory and seize any evidence or contraband which falls within
their field of vision.
Opperman and prior Court decisions are consistent on the plain
view scope analysis. The problem arises with the majority's ques-
tionable justification for entering the closed glove compartment.
The majority asserts that the search inside the closed glove com-
partment "was prompted by the presence in plain view of a number
of valuables inside the car." 5 However, entry to remove articles left
92. See Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537 (1973), which has collected cases addressing the scope of
inventory question and has catalogued those cases in terms of the area of the car searched -
i.e., trunk, glove compartment, seats, engine, and containers or breifcases within the car.
93. The leading cases considering the plain view exception to the search warrant
requirement are Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States,
390 U.S. 234 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). See note 13, supra.
94. 96 S. Ct. at 3096. In State v. Singleton, 9 Wash. App. 327, 332-33, 511 P.2d 1396, 1399-
1400 (1973), the Washington Appellate Court considered the inventory question in depth:
Reasonable cause for impoundment may, for example, include the necessity for
removing (1) an unattended-to car illegally parked or otherwise illegally obstructing
traffic; (2) an unattended-to car from the scene of an accident when the driver is
physically or mentally incapable of deciding upon steps to be taken to deal with his
property, as in the case of the intoxicated, mentally incapacitated or seriously injured
driver; (3) a car that has been stolen or used in the commission of a crime when its
retention as evidence is necessary; (4) an abandoned car; (5) a car so mechanically
defective as to be a menace to others using the public highway; (6) a car impoundable
pursuant to ordinance or statute which provides therefor as in the case of forfeiture.
The mere commission of one or more of the 27 bailable traffic offenses listed in JTR
T2.03(m) does not necessarily provide reasonable cause for impoundment. . . . There
is even case support for the view that if the driver cannot present his driver's license
when arrested on a traffic violation, impoundment on that account is not required.
95. 96 S. Ct. at 3099-3100.
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in plain view from the car does not justify a further search into the
car's closed areas. Moreover, it is apparent from the record in
Opperman that every vehicle taken into the impound lot by Vermil-
lion police was inventoried and that as a standard procedure every
inventory would involve entry into the car's closed glove compart-
ment notwithstanding the presence of valuables in plain view.91 The
true reason for sustaining the search of the closed glove compart-
ment appears to be that standard inventories often include an ex-
amination of the glove compartment, since it is a customary place
for documents of ownership. In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued
that the majority's "standard police procedure" rationale allowed
intrusions into the car and glove compartment even in the absence
of articles in plain view. Thus the presence or absence of articles in
plain view is really of only slight consequence to the majority.
In a decision a few months prior to Opperman the Wisconsin
Supreme Court considered the scope question in greater depth than
did Opperman. In State v. McDougal, the court upheld a warrant-
less inventory of items found in plain view, but held that the scope
of the inventory did not include examination of closed or locked
suitcases or containers found inside the car, glove compartment or
trunk. 7
As did Opperman, McDougal arose out of a traffic offense. De-
fendant McDougal was stopped for speeding and was subsequently
charged with failure to carry a driver's license and with operating a
motor vehicle without the owner's consent. McDougal was jailed
and the car he was driving was impounded. While making a detailed
inventory of the car, the police discovered two suitcases in the trunk
of the car and unlocked them with keys taken from the glove com-
partment. Inside the suitcases, police found a substantial quantity
of marijuana. The suitcases were seized and formed the basis for
McDougal's arrest for possession of marijuana with intent to sell.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evi-
dence discovered in the locked suitcases, holding that the search of
96. A complete inventory report is required of all vehicles impounded by the Vermillion
Police Department. The standard inventory consists of a survey of the vehicles exterior -
windows, fenders, trunk and hood - apparently for damage and its interior to locate valua-
bles for storage. As part of each inventory, a standard report form is completed. The report
in this case listed the items discovered in both the automobile's interior and the unlocked
glove compartment. The only notation regarding the trunk was that it was locked. A police
officer testified that all impounded vehicles are searched, that the search always includes the
glove compartment, and that the trunk had not been searched in this case because it was
locked. 96 S. Ct. at 3105 n. 4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. 68 Wis. 2d 399, 228 N.W.2d 671 (1975).
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the closed suitcases without a search warrant was unreasonable." In
affirming the trial court's decision, the Wisconsin court ruled that
during a routine automobile inventory, the search of a closed, locked
suitcase is unreasonable and violated the defendant's constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
In McDougal the Wisconsin court adopted the balancing test
illustrated by the Opperman concurrence and dissent in determin-
ing the permissible scope of the routine, warrantless police inven-
tory. As a result of this balancing of the state's need to search
against the individual's right to be free from intrusion, the court
specifically limited the scope of the inventory search to items found
in plain view.99 The objectives of the inventory - "protection of the
public from claims of theft and protection of the defendant's prop-
erty" do not require examination of locked or closed suitcases or
containers. For example, the court offered various alternatives to
the inventorying of closed contents or containers. The police can
simply inventory "two suitcases."'' 0 Similarly, "[t]he police would
be just as well protected against false claims of theft by inventorying
and sealing the closed suitcases as by inventorying their con-
tents.""°' The police may also ask the defendant to consent to an
inventory of the contents of the two suitcases.'M
2
In support of its position the court relied upon Mozzetti v. Supe-
rior Court,'03 State v. Keller,'04 and State v. Gwinn.'"5 In Mozzetti
v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court limited the scope
of automobile inventories to items found in plain view: "The inven-
tory by its nature involves a random search of the articles left in an
automobile taken into police custody; the police looking for nothing
in particular and everything in general."'' 6 When balanced against
98. Id. at 403, 228 N.W.2d at 673 (1975).
99. Id. at 413-14, 229 N.W.2d at 678 (1975); see note 93 supra.
100. Id. at 413, 229 N.W.2d at 678 (1975). The use of infiltrators and spot checks, in
addition to citizen complaints, would also seem to be a reasonable alternative. Perhaps
electronic equipment like that used to impede hijacking at airports could be considered. To
avoid tort claims for items left in impounded automobiles, the court in Cabbler v. Superin-
tendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, 374 F. Supp. 690, 700 (E.D. Va. 1974) suggested seals
upon the trunks and doors.
101. Id. at 413-14, 228 N.W.2d at 678 (1975).
102. Id. at 413, 228 N.W.2d at 678 (1975).
103. 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
104. 265 Or. 622, 510 P.2d 568 (1973). See 10 WILLAMErr L.J. 272 (1974).
105. 301 A.2d 291 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972).
106. 4 Cal. 3d 699, 711, 484 P.2d 84, 92, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 420 (1971); See Baker &
Khourie, Improbable Cause - The Poisonous Fruits of a Search After Arrest for a Traffic
Violation, 25 OKLA. L. REv. 54 (1972).
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a person's right to privacy, the police interests in searching the car
beyond the plain view exception were considered minimal. Thus,
the California court limited the permissible scope of inventory
searches in California to items found in plain view.
In State v. Keller, 07 police in Oregon found a fishing tackle box
sealed with wire on the floor of the back seat during a routine inven-
tory search. Inside the tackle box, the police found drugs which later
formed the basis for defendant Keller's indictment. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered
in the sealed tackle box. It held that the vials in the tackle box were
not in plain view and, therefore, were the product of an unreasona-
ble search. On appeal by the State, the Oregon Court of Appeals
found the suppression of evidence discovered in the tackle box to be
improper. Reversing the court of appeals, the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed suppression of the evidence and held the search of
the closed tackle box was an unreasonable search in violation of
defendant's federal and state constitutional rights.'
In the Delaware case of State v. Gwinn, 09 police arrested Gwinn
for drunken driving. Before his car was towed and impounded, po-
lice made an inventory pursuant to standard procedure. A closed
satchel was found in the trunk; it was opened and marijuana was
discovered inside. The court stated that the inventory of the interior
of the automobile, including the trunk, was a reasonable search, and
the seizure of the satchel was valid because it was in plain view.
However, the court held that the evidence found inside was inad-
missible because the search of the contents of the satchel was not
necessary to the otherwise valid purpose of the inventory." 0
After an analysis of the Mozzetti, Keller and Gwinn decisions,
the Wisconsin court discussed the scope question in depth and
stated: "The police can take reasonable steps to conduct a police
inventory to protect themselves against false claims but not unrea-
sonable ones.""' The Wisconsin court concluded that the examina-
tion of the contents of closed or locked suitcases or containers was
unreasonable and beyond the scope of the routine police inventory.
As a result, only evidence seized while in plain view is admissible
as evidence in a Wisconsin criminal prosecution.
107. State v. Keller, 9 Or. App. 613, 497 P.2d 868 (1971).
108. 265 Or. 622, 510 P.2d 568 (1973).
109. 301 A.2d 291 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972).
110. 68 Wis. 2d at 413-14, 228 N.W.2d at 678 (1975).
111. 96 S. Ct. at 3106 n. 6.
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In his Opperman dissent, Justice Marshall cited both McDougal
and Mozzetti in support of his position that the majority opinion
"does not authorize the inspection of suitcases, boxes or other con-
tainers which might themselves be sealed, removed and secured
without further intrusion." 112 Despite Justice Marshall's position,
the scope question remains unanswered in light of the majority
opinion in Opperman. However, the balancing test supplied by
McDougal does set forth a standard with which to define further the
limits of constitutional automobile inventories.
IV. THE IMPACT OF Opperman
In placing its imprimatur on routine police inventory searches of
impounded automobiles, the Opperman decision left a number of
questions unanswered. Opperman explicitly authorized the inven-
tory of articles in plain view and in a closed glove compartment.
Whether this holding is sufficient to sustain further intrusions into
the closed areas of a car or of closed containers within the car has
yet to be determined."3 The Court has, however, left indications
that such intrusions will also be found reasonable.
The Opperman court placed great emphasis upon the fact that
the glove compartment search was a part of standard police proce-
dure. According to the majority this factor tended "to ensure that
the intrusion would be limited in scope to the extent necessary to
carry out the caretaking function.""' This reasoning would seem to
establish a strong presumption that intrusions into other closed
areas of a car are reasonable when done as a part of routine police
procedures.
Further, the Court's preoccupation with police procedure results
in an inadequate treatment of the invasion of privacy issue. The
fourth amendment must be viewed not only in terms of whether the
search was reasonable but also whether the person's right to privacy
was protected. The majority position in Opperman seems to simply
assume that the presence of a standard procedure will protect an
individual's right to privacy. This assumption leads to the conclu-
112. Id.
113. In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated that the Court was not considering "whether
the police might open and search the glove compartment if it is locked, or whether the police
might search a locked trunk or other compartment." 96 S. Ct. at 3104 n. 1.
114. The majority here was citing a conclusion reached in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.




sion that as long as the police follow standard police procedure, a
search - no matter how injurious to a person's right to privacy -
must be rendered reasonable. Clearly, the better reasoned approach
would have been to apply a balancing test which would weigh the
individual's right to privacy against the government's interests in
searching a car.15 This balancing test would not delegate the indi-
vidual's right to privacy to a position of secondary importance.
The right to privacy was not the only issue evaded by the
Opperman Court. A strong argument can be made that a standard
warrantless automobile inventory is merely a "pretext concealing an
investigatory motive.""' Whatever the motive or purpose underly-
ing the inventory, it is conducted in the same manner and would
have the same result as a search. The Opperman Court did not go
beyond the police department's assertions of purposes for these
searches. Thus, in order to surmount the "investigatory motive"
argument, the police need only assert the benign purposes for the
inventory. Obviously, the constitutional right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures should not depend upon the subjec-
tive motives of the police." 7
The Opperman decision suggests other possible inroads into the
fourth amendment reasonableness standard. The majority empha-
sized "the need to protect the police from danger" as one reason for
sustaining the automobile inventory."' Procedures employed to ef-
fectuate this end would necessarily entail searching beyond a glove
compartment. Weapons, bombs or other dangerous articles can also
be found in a trunk or in a closed container. In fact, if the purpose
of protecting the police is to have any legitimacy, the police will
have to expand their inventory procedures in some instances to
115. See generally Note, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy - Katz v. United States, a
Post Scriptum, 9 IND. L. REV. 468 (1976); 43 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 98 (1974).
116. The majority noted that there was "no suggestion that this standard procedure
essentially like that followed throughout the country, was a pretext concealing an investiga-
tory motive." 96 S. Ct. at 3100. But see Pigford v. United States, 273 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1971)
wherein it was held that an inventory search was exploratory and therefore forbidden.
117. The court in Boulet v. State, 109 Ariz. 433, 435, 511 P.2d 168, 170 (1973) noted:
We believe that there has been unnecessary confusion caused by insisting upon an
either/or requirement as to the motives for inventorying the contents of the automobile.
It is unrealistic to require that in justifying the inventory search the police must affirm
that they had no hope or expectation of finding something incriminating. What makes
an inventory search reasonable under the requirements of the Fourth Amendment is
not that the subjective motives of the police were simplistically pure, but whether the
facts of the situation indicate that the inventory is reasonable under the circumstan-
ces.
118. 96 S. Ct. at 3096.
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include a full examination of the car, its contents, the trunk, and
any closed or locked containers.
Nevertheless, the impact of Opperman on lower court decisions
is likely to be somewhat limited due to the Court's failure ade-
quately to deal with all the issues. The majority's failure to employ
a balancing test or to discuss the scope question in any depth led
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, to conclude: "[I]t should be clear
in any event that this Court's holding does not preclude a contrary
resolution of [other cases] involving the same issues under any
applicable state law."' 9
The Opperman decision is so incomplete that Justice Marshall
perceived little chance that courts will be substantially affected.
However, incompleteness is the least of Opperman's weaknesses. In
the effort to give to its decision an aura of consistency the Court was
forced to reinterpret several cases by ignoring crucial distinctions
between those cases and the facts of Opperman. The Court was also
forced to rely upon purposes of an inventory which give little consid-
eration to the individual's right to privacy. Finally, the Opperman
majority refused to use a balancing test. The rationale presented by
the majority results in, at best, a confused lead to follow. Instead
of actually untangling the "web" of automobile search law, the
majority conjured up a new one.
The better reasoned approach would have been to tackle the
questions presented by automobile inventories head-on. The Court
should have closely scrutinized the purposes of an inventory, ana-
lyzed the scope question by considering standard police practice as
merely one among many factors, and finally, balanced the right to
privacy against the need to search. This analysis would almost cer-
tainly have led to a different result in Opperman and a more ade-
quate guide for lower courts. Opperman's evasion of key issues such
as the individual's right to privacy and the scope of the search
apparently leaves the door open to the lower courts to analyze differ-
ent factual inventory questions independently of the Supreme
Court's holding. Nevertheless, the lower courts will still have to deal
with Opperman's proposition that a routine inventory of an im-
pounded automobile constitutes a new exception to the warrant
requirement.' 21
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